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The papers collected in this symposium issue were delivered
in preliminary form at a conference held at Stanford Law School
in February of 1984. Together, they amount to a series of ex-
cited reports from explorers returning from journeys into the
heart of a vast, mysterious, and almost unmapped interior of
American society, its large metropolitan law firms. Rather un-
usually, these explorers' reports are further supplemented by the
comments of some eminent natives of that heartland, the practic-
ing lawyers themselves. The hope of the conference's arrangers
was that if most of the small band of legal scholars who have in-
vestigated the corporate law firm could be brought together with
a few exceptionally reflective practitioners, some progress might
be made toward shaping these hitherto relatively isolated and
fragmentary efforts into a field of study. This hope, I believe,
these papers and the comments on them abundantly fulfill. They
make a start at identifying some of the major questions to be
asked, and at intelligently guessing the probable-contours of the
answers. They also show how little is reliably known about these
institutions and what they do. Best of all, they suggest how excit-
ing it might be to try to find out more.
When one thinks about it for a moment, it seems astonishing
that law firms should have for so long remained almost unex-
plored in legal scholarship. These are, after all, social institu-
tions of some prominence. They have a significant place in the
economy, billing some $38 billion annually. Their members
serve as a class of generalist-intermediaries, linking together di-
verse segments-manufacturers, investors, bankers, insurers, un-
derwriters, brokers, fund managers-of the business world.
They are important in the political economy, as negotiators be-
tween business corporations and the taxing and regulatory state,
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and as the primary interpreters to business of the mysteries of
bureaucratic government. They have some function (exactly
what resists easy description) in the symbolic economy, as produ-
cers of the symbols of legality, reassurance to the world that their
clients' transactions fit somehow into the framework of social le-
gitimacy. They have a place in the social structure, as a provider
of careers (and often considerable wealth) for young people who
get high grades at school, and as a means of certifying to their
parents and to society arrival into or maintenance of authority,
power, and status. They are avenues of mobility into high ranks
of business and public office.
At law schools such as Stanford's, law firms are looming, in-
deed dominating presences in the life of the school, claiming the
obsessive and (as it sometimes seems) nearly exclusive attention
of almost all the students in the school from the middle of the
first year onwards. Yet the legal academy from its inception has
on the whole made a determined decision to remain aloof from
the institutions where most of its students will spend their ca-
reers. We do a reasonably good job preparing our students to
become common law judges, and a respectable though not quite
so good job preparing them to become legislative and bureau-
cratic policymakers. Scholars have also performed useful services
for students interested in criminal, welfare, family, or personal
injury law: Thanks to legal sociologists and anthropologists, a lot
of good research now exists about how courts, lawyers, and other
legal institutions (for example, welfare bureaucracies, court
clerks, and the police) handle the problems that arise in such
practices. As far as I know, we have never produced, for teaching
purposes, any good descriptions, much less scholarly analyses, of
what it is that corporate lawyers spend most of their time doing.
Without such descriptions, the prospect seems hopeless of ac-
complishing what law schools (like any other professional
schools) ought to be doing: teaching a theoretically informed,
critically reflective set of approaches to professional practice
tasks.
In recent years, to be sure, writers outside of the academy
have been busy tearing off the veils that discreetly screened law
firms from vulgar curiosity. I mean of course the writers for such
papers as the American Lawyer and National Law Journal, who have
astonishingly contrived to turn corporate practice- which even
the lawyers most devoted to it have to admit contains some of the
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world's dullest jobs-into material for gossip columns. They
keep track of the suddenly volatile employment and reputational
markets of the legal elite: which firms are in hot demand and
which are in serious financial trouble, who has triumphed and
who has failed in handling a big transaction or litigation, who is
splitting with his partners and taking major clients with him,
which firms best train and sybaritically indulge their summer
clerks, and what everyone gets paid. Sometimes this reporting
results in wonderfully thorough, detailed, blow-by-blow accounts
of litigation strategy, the negotiations behind a major deal such
as the Chrysler bail-out, or the quarrels leading to a client's de-
sertion or firm's dissolution. (The stories collected in James
Stewart's The Partners' are among the best examples of the
genre.) The new legal journalism has its weak points, mostly
those inherent in the form: the natural tendencies to dwell on
personalities at the expense of structures, to be unable to resist
repeating any quotable remark, and to glamorize its subjects
sometimes to the point of absurdity.2 Its exhaustive reporting
has nevertheless shrewdly identified-indeed has been the first
source anywhere to identify-some of the main causes and symp-
toms of the current revolution in the organization of corporate
firm practice: corporate clients' newly intolerant awareness of
high legal costs and consequent decisions to shift much legal
business in-house, to spread outside business among several
firms, and to be quick to take it elsewhere if dissatisfied; the in-
tense competition for clients, which leads firms to adopt novel
techniques to control costs and increase output- pressuring as-
sociates to bill more hours, raising the ratios of lower-paid (asso-
ciates, paralegals) to higher-paid (partners) staff, standardizing
routine transactions, converting to capital-intensive technologies
and to compensation systems that reward high billings, weeding
out unprofitable clients or transactions; the sudden mobility of
lawyers among firms that until recently expected their life-long
loyalty; and the gradual acceptance of the profit-maximization
principle as the guiding norm of firm life.
It is the great merit of this symposium that it tries to give
these trends an examination both more sustained and more criti-
1. J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS (1983).
2. Stewart, for example, combines a tough-guy muckraker's tone with a star-struck
awe at how smart and hardworking the corporate lawyers he writes about are, and how
important the deals are that they handle.
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cal than the new legal journalism has been able and willing to do.
Abram and Antonia Chayes analyze in some detail the novel
functions that expanded in-house counsel's office has assumed,
and suggest that the shift of functions has unalterably wrested
from the outside law firm the capacity to dominate direction of
traditional clients' legal affairs. Robert Kagan and Robert Ro-
sen's essay on the social functions of firms, Robert Nelson's study
of big-firm-big-client relations, and John Heinz and Edward
Laumann's more specialized study of Washington lawyers, are all
concerned with the issue of lawyers' "autonomy," that is, with
the extent that lawyers are able to influence the conceptualization
and preferred solutions to their clients' legal problems: Each ar-
rives at the tentative conclusion that outside lawyers on the
whole have neither the opportunity nor the desire to reshape
their clients' business or political goals and chiefly confine their
role to that of technical execution. Ronald Gilson and Robert
Mnookin explore another aspect of the changing organization of
practice, that of partner compensation systems; they suggest
both economic and cultural explanations for differences in sys-
tems, and speculate on the strengths and weaknesses of the dif-
ferent types. In contrast to a journalistic literature that has
celebrated the efficiency gains from the new competition in law
practice, Deborah Rhode and William Simon point up the darker
sides of these changes: the potential for the competitive pressure
to make it even more difficult than it has usually been for the bar
to cartelize ethical standards (Rhode), and for the aggressive em-
phasis on profit-maximizing norms to dissipate still further the
"Brandeisian" or "progressive" ethic that professionalism entails
collegial solidarity in the organization of work and the coordina-
tion of private practice with a vision of the public good (Simon).
Taken together, these essays and the comments on them
make up a fascinating, if also disturbing, set of portraits of mod-
em practice. They also make us realize how little about this
world we really know. Here, -for instance, are a few fairly basic
questions about corporate lawyers on which very little work of-
fers reliable answers: (1) What does a law firm actually accom-
plish for its clients, anyway? In a well-known recent speech,
Derek Bok has suggested that the answer is often, "Nothing of
much social or economic value," that much corporate practice
simply wastes corporate assets and educated talent that could be
turned to more productive, Japan-shaming purposes. The ques-
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tion has real bite because nothing lawyers do is "functionally nec-
essary," since alternative occupations, practices, or institutions
are always available as substitutes. Litigation can give way to set-
tlement strategies, simply to "taking one's lumps," or to "non-
legal" dispute-processing forms; the role of lawyers as in-
termediaries or problem-solvers can be pre-empted by others-
lobbyists, tax accountants, title insurance companies, bureau-
cratic staffs; work calling for a high degree of specialized intellect
or judgment can be standardized to be performable by semi-au-
tomatic routines. One of the participants in this symposium has
recently suggested some ways to think about how business law-
yers add value to the transactions they work on, but this is a rare
piece of serious work on an issue mostly addressed through
cliches and polemics.3 (2) What effects does the intermediation
of the corporate bar have on the implementation of public pol-
icy? One stock answer is that elite lawyers are important agents
of the policy goals embodied in law both because they play an
active role in helping to formulate those goals and because they
educate their clients to the long-run benefits of compliance. A
contradictory answer, heard just as often if not more so, is that
corporate lawyers systematically frustrate public policy objectives
through adversary tactics and technical evasion.4 Quite aside
from lawyers' intended effects upon regulatory strategies, what are
the unintended effects-the ways in which the structures and cul-
tures of law practice filter and transform both legal enactments
and client's preferences? (3) What do corporate lawyers actually
do, besides practicing (in the narrowest sense) law? Tradition-
ally, of course, lawyers have used their practices as home bases
for participation in a great variety of political and business ven-
tures. What would one discover if one looked at firms primarily
as nodes within networks of political influence, rather than as
performers of functional tasks for clients? Might one find, for
example, that the new competition for legal business has reduced
the tolerance of major firms for partners who use the firms
mainly as way-stations for politics or public office? (4) What is
the internal sociology of firm practice? What kinds of people are
hired; who stays and who leaves; are the old ethnic and gender
3. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J.
239 (1984).
4. See Clune, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the Model for Public
Policy, Research, and the Changing Role of Law and Lawyers, 69 IoWA L. REv. 47, 98-122
(1983).
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hierarchies breaking down; what have the new conditions of prac-
tice done to the 1960s- and 1970s-derived movements for flexi-
ble work and pro bono opportunities?
These are only a few areas of the dark interior continent that
the participants in this symposium have begun to explore. At the
moment our understanding looks like an ancient map. The
shorelines are clearly outlined, and some of the major rivers. But
the rest of the heartland is drawn as blank spaces, with the occa-
sional mysterious notation, "Diamond Mines," or warning,
"Here there be Tygers."
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